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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

27 January 1961
JCSM-44-61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned with the situation presented by steadily increasing military strength of the Castro Government and the tight grasp of the Communists over the means of counter-revolution, including the military, the police and governmental financial resources as well as the organs of propaganda. Unless the United States takes immediate and forceful action, there is a great and present danger that Cuba will become permanently established as a part of the Communist Bloc, with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides a Communist base of operations for export of similar revolutions to an already unstable and potentially explosive Latin America.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the primary objective of the United States in Cuba should be the speedy overthrow of the Castro Government, followed by the establishment of a pro-U.S. Government which, with U.S. support, will

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(JCS 2304/19 - Approved 27 Jan 61)

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accomplish the desired objectives for the Cuban people. Great emphasis is placed on the urgent necessity for the United States to locate, train and support such Cuban nationals as will be capable of establishing a new non-Communist government once Castro is overthrown.

3. The current Political-Para-Military Plan does not assure the accomplishment of the above objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate.

4. As you recall, at the conference between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1961 this problem was addressed. At that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a Joint Staff concept of an ascending scale of U.S. supported or directed actions to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro Government. This concept, which is appended hereto, was intended to demonstrate the key elements in the development of an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government. That conference informally agreed that an Inter-Departmental Planning Group should be established to develop a detailed over-all U.S. Plan of Action along the general lines indicated in the Appendix.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:

a. An over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government be developed by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group.

b. Such an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government include, but not be limited to the following:

(1) Mission

(2) Each feasible course of action (as set forth in the Appendix hereto, or as revised by the planners), with sub-elements as follows:

(a) The concept of operations for the course of action.

(b) Specific Tasks required of Executive Agencies concerned to accomplish the course of action.

(3) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Designation of Agency or individual responsible for inter-departmental coordination and arrangement for reviewing and approval of the Plan.

(4) Requirements for supporting plans.

(5) Special provisions for continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis for determining U.S. course of action.

(6) Command relationships for implementation of each course of action.

c. The resultant over-all U.S. Plan of Action, after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate agencies and approval by the President, be supported by detailed plans by the cognizant Executive Agencies for the implementation of tasks set forth in the over-all U.S. Plan of Action.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to assign personnel to participate in this Inter-Departmental Planning for the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX

CONCEPT OF ACTIONS

(chart)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
CONCEPT	PRESSURE	INTERNAL UPRISING	VOLUNTEER INVASION FORCE W/ COVERT SUPPORT	GUERILLA FORCE WITH COVERT SUPPORT	VOLUNTEER INVASION FORCE WITH OVERT ACTION	OVERT U.S. ACTION SUPPORTED BY L. A. VOLUNTEERS	UNILATERAL OVERT U. S. ACTION
	ECONOMIC BREAK DIP RELATIONS O.A.S. ACN. PROPAGANDA & INFO. NAVAL/AERIAL SURVEILLANCE EMBARGO SHOW OF FORCE COMM & TRANS. ISOLATION	FOSTER THRU PROGANGANDA & PRESSURE A GENERAL INTERNAL UPRISING BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE	TRAIN AND EQUIP SMALL VOL. FORCE CUBAN EXILES TO INVADE, ESTABLISH A CENTER OF RESISTANCE FOR ANTI CASTRO GUERRILLAS TO RALLY TO ESTABLISH PRO U.S. GOVT	TRAIN ANTI CASTRO CUBAN EXILES IN U.W. INSERT INTO CUBA TO EST. U.W. UNITS INITIATE GUERILLA WAR FARE W U S. COVERT SUPPORT	SAME AS (3), PLUS PLANNED OVERT FOLLOW UP BY U.S. FORCES NAVAL BLOCKADE	INVASION BY U S. MILITARY FORCES IN CONJUNCTION W L.A. VOLUNTEERS NAVAL BLOCKADE	INVASION BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES ONLY. NAVAL BLOCKADE
MIL REQ.	NAVAL/AERIAL SURVEILLANCE EMBARGO SHOW OF FORCE	LOG. SUPT.	LOGISTIC SUPPORT	LOG. SUPT.	ARMY, NAVAL & A.F. COMBAT UNITS LOGISTIC UNITS SUPPLIES NAVAL BLOCKADE	SAME AS (5) NAVAL BLOCKADE	SAME AS (5) NAVAL BLOCKADE
STATUS OF MIL. REQ.	CURRENT NAVAL MANEUVERS	NO PLAN (PLAN BEING INITIATED)	SUPPORT PROVIDED AS REQUIRED	NO ACTION	NO ACTION (PLAN REQUIRED)	MODIFICATION OF CURRENT CONT. PLAN REQUIRED EST PROGRAM OF L.A. VOL. REQ.	CINCLANT CONTINGENCY PLAN (BEING MODIFIED)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

January 28, 1961

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Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba
Cabinet Room, January 28, 1961

Present: The President, The Vice President, The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes, Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting began with a description of the present situation in Cuba by the Director of Central Intelligence. The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid andcontinuing build-up of Castro's military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.

The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are.

The present estimate of the Department of Defense is that no course of action currently authorized by the United States Government will be effective in reaching the agreed national objective of overthrowing the Castro regime. Meanwhile, the Department of State sees grave political dangers to our position throughout the Western hemisphere in any overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States.

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After considerable discussion, the following proceedings were authorized by the President:

1. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, including increased propaganda, increased political action and increased sabotage. Continued overflights for these purposes were specifically authorized.

2. The Defense Department, with CIA, will review proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory, and the results of this analysis will be promptly reported to the President.

3. The Department of State will prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It is expected that this proposal may involve a commitment of the President's personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt and Quadros.

Finally, it was agreed that the United States must make entirely clear that its position with respect to the Cuban Government is currently governed by its firm opposition to Communist penetration of the American Republics, and not by any hostility to democratic social revolution and economic reform. The President intends to deal with this matter himself in the State of the Union Address.

The President particularly desires that no hint of these discussions reach any personnel beyond those most immediately concerned within the Executive Branch.

McGeorge Bundy

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JCSM 57-61

X- FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan

Attached hereto is the Military Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency Para-Military Plan, Cuba. Subject to your concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to forward copies of their assessment of the plan to the Director for Central Intelligence with the proposal that they meet with the Director for Central Intelligence and members of his staff for further discussion of this project.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment (16)

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3 Jul 61

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the feasibility of the military portion of the CIA plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Regime and arrived at the following conclusions:

a. Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made.

b. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff the beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

c. There should be a review of the plan for air movement to the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of compromise.

d. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized control.

e. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air operations is within the capability of the Air units and should be successful.

f. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault would be opposed, it should be successful.

g. The amphibious assault should be successful even if lightly opposed; however the personnel and plans for logistic support, are marginal at best. Against moderate, determined resistance logistic support as presently planned will be inadequate.

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h. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound.

i. Additional planning is required concerning the control and utilization of indigenous facilities, and personnel both for combat and support functions.

j. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands to support from outside the beachhead area rather than combining with the invasion force as currently planned.

k. Without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to the area by D / 2. Necessity to develop the situation and prepare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two additional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three above factors would further delay a coordinated attack.

l. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

m. Even if the task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

n. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

o. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

p. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be

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noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

q. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.

2. It is recommended that the enclosed study be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for information and consideration.

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MILITARY EVALUATION OF PARA-MILITARY PLAN

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the feasibility of the purely military portion of the CIA plan for action to effect the overthrow of Castro.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The mission of the Task Force of Volunteer Cuban Exiles is to:

a. Invade the island of Cuba by amphibious and airborne assault.

b. Hold a beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government, act as a rallying point for volunteers and as a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba.

c. Integrate with existing guerrilla bands and carry on guerrilla operations if driven from the beachhead area.

3. For facts on the enemy forces; dissident forces in the general area of operations; the strength, organization and equipment of the Task Force; the proposed general area of operations; and the concept of operations, see Annex "A".

CONCLUSIONS

4. Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made.

5. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff, the beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

6. There should be a review of the plan for air movement to the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of compromise.

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7. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized control.

8. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air operations is within the capability of the air units and should be successful.

9. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault would be opposed, it should be successful.

10. The amphibious assault should be successful even if lightly opposed. However, the personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. Against moderate, determined resistance, logistic support as presently planned will be inadequate.

11. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound.

12. Additional planning is required concerning the control and utilization of indigenous facilities and personnel, both for combat and support functions.

13. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands to support from outside the beachhead area rather than combining with the invasion force as currently planned.

14. Without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to the area by D+2. Necessity to develop the situation and prepare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two additional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three above factors would further delay a coordinated attack.

15. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

16. Even if the invasion Task Force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-up forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

17. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

18. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

19. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third-hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

20. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the basic memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which sets forth the above conclusions and recommends that a copy of this evaluation be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency for his information and consideration.

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A N N E X "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Enemy Forces. (Appendix "A" for details)

a. Cuban Army - Total, 32,000 personnel, including 9,000 police, organized into four infantry regiments (strength, 2,000), three artillery battalions, three tank battalions and one AAA battalion. Nearest Army force to beachhead is approximately 100 miles away, consisting of 6,000 troops (one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion and one tank battalion, not confirmed). In beachhead area, there is a police squadron.

b. Air Force - Three F-47; one F-51; 14 Sea Fury; 13 B-26; six TBM-38; 15 transport type aircraft; 22 helicopters of various types.

c. Navy - Total, approximately 5,000 personnel. Three PF; two PCE; 43 smaller craft.

d. Militia - Between 200,000 and 300,000 in strength. Well armed but combat capability is questionable. Approximately 1,200 militia are located in the beachhead area.

e. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces is low but improving. This improvement partially offset by deteriorating morale.

2. Friendly Forces. (Appendix "B" for details)

a. Cuban Task Force - 1,004 personnel.

(1) An Infantry Battalion of four rifle companies (one airborne), totaling approximately 826 personnel and armed to include 4.2 mortars and 77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon of 5 M41 tanks.

(2) An Air Force consisting of 17 B-26's; 10 C-54's; 5 C-46's; supported by approximately 100 personnel, 18 of which are pilots. Maintenance is excellent and has adequate logistic support.

(3) Navy - 3 LCU's; 2 LST type; 2 LCI; 4 LCP; 1 LSD (USN); and supported by approximately 40 Naval personnel.

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b. Guerrillas - In Cuba, total 1,500 but in general area of beachhead (25 mile radius) five bands with an estimated strength of 660.

c. Cuban Volunteers after invasion. CIA is counting on a sizeable number of indigenous volunteers. This support will undoubtedly develop but the numbers cannot be estimated. Arms for 1,500 volunteers are included in initial lift.

3. Characteristics of the Invasion Area.

a. Terrain - The beachhead area is generally semi-circular with a perimeter of approximately 11 miles. Within the beachhead area is a small city, a small airfield, roadnet and a river. The perimeter of the beachhead is generally anchored on low hill masses with a commanding hill mass, approximately 700 feet in height, at its north center. The area between the hill masses and the ocean is generally flat, with wooded and cultivated areas. Two good roads enter the area from the east and the west, with a railroad entering from the northeast. Tanks generally can operate throughout the beachhead.

b. Landing beaches - There are three small beaches in the landing area, two at river mouths and one on the west side of the bay formed by the rivers. The left river mouth beach is 100 to 150 yards in length, with 12 foot water depth up to the beach. The center beach, at the main river mouth, is 100 to 150 yards in length, with shoal water off the beach making it suitable only for LCVP's. The third beach, on the west side of the bay, is 50 to 60 yards in width with 7 feet of water up to the beach and easily identifiable by four buildings to the rear of the beach. Exits at all beaches are suitable for small vehicles, while the exit from the west beach

is very good, suitable for vehicles and tanks. The seaward approaches are clear.

c. Airborne drop zone - The planned drop zone is approximately 2,000 yards in length, open and generally flat. It is located near the commanding hill mass within the beachhead. It is considered suitable for a company drop zone.

d. Strategic location - The beachhead is so located that it is remote from known concentrations of Cuban Army, access routes are limited and it can be readily isolated by cutting highway and railroad bridges at river crossings outside the beachhead area. Rugged terrain in the vicinity facilitates expansion of para-military operations.

4. Concept. (Appendix "C" for details) On D-1, air strikes are designed to neutralize Cuban Air Force, Cuban Naval patrol vessels, key communications facilities, and destroy tanks and artillery in parks. Second priority is isolation of the objective area. Following a feint on the night of D-1, prior to first light on D Day, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop in the vicinity of the key hill mass and by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominate entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in general area of operations. Small air strip in area will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. Force will establish control within beach-head area and if driven therefrom, be prepared to withdraw from beachhead area and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities. For detailed concept of air employment and capabilities, see Appendix "D" to Annex "A".

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5. Logistics. (Appendix "B" for details) The supply of Class I, III and V is adequate. The shipping is limited and allows no margin for miscalculation or unforeseen contingencies. Of the 826 personnel in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters. The quantities of Class I, III and V supplies are adequate for the operation. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability. Plans call for Class I, III and V supplies to be mounted-out from New Orleans, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis.

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APPENDIX "A" TO ANNEX "A"

ENEMY FORCES

1. Army

Strength - 32,000 (incl. 9,000 Rural Police)

Organization - 3 Tactical Combat Forces plus 1 Parachute Regiment (approximately 1500); 1 AA Battalion.

Each Tactical Force consists of:

1 Infantry Regiment (approximately 1900)
1 Artillery Battalion (approximately 435)
1 Armored Battalion (approximately 313)
1 Engineer Co. (approximately 125)
1 Signal Co. (approximately 100)

Total strength - 2873

Areas of Concentration:

Havana - Managua (approximately 5000)
Western Tactical Combat Force
AA Battalion
Armor School
Military Academy

Santa Clara (approximately 6,000)
Central Tactical Combat Force

Santiago de Cuba - Oriente Province
Eastern Tactical Combat Force
Parachute Regiment

General Area of Operations:

No army forces known to be in area except AA position at Topas de Colantes believed manned by Cuban Army personnel. MG positions on hills believed manned by militia personnel.

2. Militia

Strength: Estimated between 200,000 and 300,000.

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Organization: Heterogeneous. Each village and town has a militia unit. Size varies according to size of town. Unit assembled on call at local police post. Orders received via police communications net and transmitted by runner.

Weapons: Varied; however, most members of militia have been issued a weapon, some members multiple weapons. Many new automatic weapons are in hands of militiamen - submachine guns, especially.

General Area of Operations: Between 12,000 and 30,000 engaged with army units in anti-guerrilla operations in mountains. Militia training camp at Sancti Spiritus has 1500 militiamen from other provinces in training. Local militia not trusted by Castro to fight guerrillas. Militia stations are located at the mouths of rivers in area.

3. Navy

Strength: Estimated at approximately 5000.

Vessels: No major combat vessels.

1 Frigate (4" guns) located Santiago.

1 Frigate (4" guns) located Cienfuegos.

Various smaller craft engaged in patrol of north and south coasts. All ships and boats are subject to frequent prolonged stand-downs for maintenance. Intervened yachts being used for patrol purposes.

General Area of Operations: No combat vessels, but probably several small patrol craft on any given day. Frigates have very low combat potential due to age of craft, inexperienced crews, and high maintenance factor.

4. Air Forces

Strength: Total strength is unknown.

Aircraft: 1 F51

3 F47

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14 Sea Fury MK-1

13 B-26

6 TBM-3S

Various transports and helicopters

Some T-33, T-6, and N2S are in inventory but exact numbers are unknown.

Locations: San Antonio de los Banos

Santiago de Cuba

Camaguay

Campo Liberdad (Havana)

Baracoa (Helicopter)

San Julian

General Area of Operations: No aircraft known to be based in the immediate area. However, Camaguay, San Antonio and Campo Liberdad are within supporting range.

5. Police

Strength: Approximately 9000

Organization: 6 Regiments (1 per Military District - corresponds to Provincial Boundaries)

Squadrons (approximately 165 each) (each regiment varies as to number of squadrons)

3 platoons per squadron

Police posts (4-15 men each) established by platoons.

General Area of Operations:

1 Squadron - Headquarters in objective area.

Police posts in each village and town vary in size from 5 - 50 men each.

6. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces

(1) Low but improving.

(2) There have been no tank sightings in Las Villas province in over four months despite presumed presence of a tank

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battalion at Santa Clara. Loyalty of armor personnel to Castro believed wavering.

(3) Motor transport is provided by any type of conveyance available at the time needed.

(4) Loyalty of militia very suspect.

(5) Tactical communication facilities poor, especially to and among militia elements.

(6) Naval units probably would seek to avoid contact with or detection of any amphibious force.

(7) Qualified pilots in short supply for combat aircraft. Maintenance standards low and spare parts not available.

APPENDIX "B" TO ANNEX "A"

FRIENDLY FORCES

1. General - The Task Force as currently organized consists of a ground force unit with a limited amphibious and airborne capability; a Naval support element and an Air Force combat and support element. Total strength of the Task Force is approximately 1,040 officers and enlisted men.

2. Ground Force Unit - The Ground Force Unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion but is called an Assault Force. Its total personnel strength is 826. Organization of the Assault Force is as shown below:

a. Assault Force

1 - Hqs and Support Co - 85 Personnel

(1) Brigade Hqs

(5) TACP's

(1) Supply Det.

(1) Medical Det.

4 - Rifle Companies - 161 Personnel each

(2) Rifle Companies

(1) Airborne (trained)

(1) Motorized (trained)

3 Rifle Platoons and 1 Weapons Platoon in each Rifle Company.

1 - Heavy Gun Company - 72 Personnel

1 4.2 mm Mortar Plt.

1 75 RR Plt.

1 50 Cal. M.A. Plt.

1 - Tank Platoon - 25 Personnel

5 M41 Tanks Mounting 76mm Gun

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b. Rifle Company Organization Personnel Strength 161

1 Co. Hqs. - 15 Personnel

3 Rifle Platoons - 39 Personnel each

3 Rifle Squads each - 9 Personnel each

1 Weapons Platoon - 29 Personnel

3 57 RR Rifle Squads with 1 57 RR Rifle each

3 81mm Mortor Crews, 1 81mm Mortar each

c. Heavy Gun Company Organization Personnel Strength 72

1 Co. Hqs - 10 Personnel

1 4.2mm Mortar Plt. - 22 Personnel 3 - 4.2 Mortar

1 50 Cal MG Plt - 15 Personnel 3 - 50 Cal MG's

1 75mm Recoilless Rifle Plt. - 15 Personnel 3 - 75 RR Rifles

1 81mm Mortar Plt. - 15 Personnel - 6 - 81mm Mortar

d. Summary of Weapons Within Assault Force

Pistols	235
M-1 Rifles	270
Grenade Launchers	27
Submachine Guns	330
BAR's	72
LMG's	24
50 Cal. M.G.'s	3
57mm Recoilless Rifles	12
75mm Recoilless Rifle	3
81mm Mortar	12
4.2mm Mortar	6
Flame Thrower	4
3.5 inch Rocket Launcher	12

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g. Vehicles Assigned to Assault Force

Truck, 2½ Ton	12
Truck, ¼ Ton	11
Truck, 5 Ton Reefer, 3000 gal cap.	2
Tractor, D-6	1
Trailer, St. - Commo	2
Trailer, ¼ Ton	9
Lift, Fork, 3 Ton	2
Tank, M41 A1	5

f. Communication Facilities. No detail breakdown provided. However, man pack radios in sufficient numbers to establish an interassault Force Command Net will be issued. Also a command net to supply ship afloat will be established.

3. Naval Support Element. The current Naval Support Unit personnel strength is approximately 40. This includes eleven (11) personnel trained as an underwater demolition team. However, they may be employed to mark the channel approach for amphibious landing craft.

Vessels to Support Operations

LSU	3
LST (Type)	2
LCI	2
LCVP	4
LSD (US Navy)	1

4. Air Force Combat and Support Element. Current Air Force Unit personnel strength is approximately 100. This includes 18 trained pilots.

Appendix "B" to
Annex "A"

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Aircraft Available	
B 26	17
C 54	10
C 46	5

5. Special Purpose Detachment. To insure that key bridges in general area of operations are denied the enemy, a special purpose airborne detachment consisting of eighty (80) individuals has been trained to parachute into objective area and accomplish this mission.

6. Friendly Guerrilla Bands. According to the latest Intelligence available, five Guerrilla Bands with a total estimated strength of 660 are active within a 25 mile radius of beachhead area. Another Band with an estimated strength of ninety (90) is approximately 35 miles East of beachhead area. Two additional Bands with a total estimated strength of 250 are located some 50 miles North of beachhead area.

7. Miscellaneous

a. Elements of the Task Force are receiving training at 3 separate locations.

b. Reportedly, personnel of the Task Force are well-trained and willing to fight. Leadership is effective and reliable.

c. Reports indicate that personnel have reached a fine edge of training which they will lose if not employed in the near future for purpose intended.

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APPENDIX C TO ANNEX "A"

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Movement from the Training Area - The Airborne Company will be moved to a training area so that they will be unaware of the movement of the remainder of the force. At time of loading onto the two LST type vessels, the remaining troops will be moved by air over a period of three nights to Puerto Cabezas and moved directly aboard ships at the docks adjacent to the airfield. The airborne company will be loaded aboard the transport aircraft the night of D-1 Day at the airfield at Retalhuleu.

2. Movement of Surface Vessels - Both LST's load initial supplies at New Orleans commencing on D-18. Depart for Puerto Cabezas on D-16 and D-11 respectively. The two LCI's arrive Vieques on D-15, load crews of the LCU's, LCUP's, tanks and UDT personnel and depart on D-5 to Pt #1, Cayman Islands (1091 mi.). The two LST's arrive at Puerto Cabeza on D-8 and D-7 respectively and depart on D-3 to Pt #1 (542 mi.). All shipping, except the LSD, rendezvous at Pt #1 (Cayman Islands), 138 mi. from the beachhead area on D-1. The sea group rendezvous with the LSD at Pt #2, 10 mi. from beachhead area at H-5 on D-Day.

3. D-1 Day Operations - Air strikes will be conducted, commencing early morning, by 12 B-26's against targets in the following priority: Cuban aircraft on the airfields, Cuban naval patrol vessels, key communication facilities (3 micro-wave installations), tank and artillery parks at Managua, then the highway and railroad bridges outside the beachhead area as well as other key bridges in Cuba.

Approximately 2000 on D-1 Day, a deception landing will be staged off the Northwest coast of Cuba by two craft equipped with Beach Jumper type equipment.

During the evening, teams will be parachuted to the three key bridges outside the beachhead area to destroy them if the air strikes had failed the previous afternoon.

4. D-Day - The surface shipping proceeds to transport area off the beaches to arrive prior to dawn. CIA personnel will drive the LCU's and LCVP's from the LSD (which will withdraw immediately) then deliver them to the Cuban personnel from the LCI's. Troops will be transferred to the landing craft.

Just prior to dawn the B-26's will conduct operations against the beaches and the airborne landing zone.

At dawn, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop and amphibious landing on the East and West beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain, along the perimeter, which dominate the city and entrance routes into the beachhead area. The small air strip will be cleared and supplies moved over the beach by one platoon remaining at the beach, plus headquarters personnel and impressed labor. The timing calls for control of the beachhead by the night of D-Day.

5. The concept envisions the joining of local volunteers and eventual tie-in with guerilla forces currently operating within 25 miles of the beachhead. The initial logistics lift includes paramilitary packs for the equipping of 1500 volunteers.

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6. The force will defend the beachhead and if driven therefrom it will be prepared to withdraw from the beachhead, link up with current guerrilla groups and continue guerrilla operations.

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APPENDIX "D" TO ANNEX "A"

AIR CAPABILITIES

1. On D-1 the volunteer air force will utilize 14 of their 17 B-26 aircraft. They will have 6 U. S. and 12 Cuban B-26 pilots to utilize. Six of the Cuban pilots are presently more proficient in dive and skip bombing and strafing than their U. S. instructors.

2. Their primary target will be the Cuban Air Force which they will attempt to destroy on the ground in the first strikes. These strikes will be conducted simultaneously, and directed primarily against 6 airfields which are the only ones on which aircraft having any combat potential are presently based. An American pilot will be used in the strike force against each base. Each of the aircraft used against the bases will be armed with 2-750 lb. napalm bombs; 16-220 lb. fragmentary bombs; plus 8-50 cal. machine guns and 2400 rounds of 50 cal ammunition. Target folders have been prepared for the airfields and weather information will be provided by Omaha Weather Central which has proven itself 85-93% accurate in its forecasts.

3. On D-1 the volunteer air force will also strike Castro's 3 micro-wave communication centers, naval units, interdiction targets in the landing area, and other selected targets. On D-Day they will primarily support the landings by strafing the beaches, attacking bridges, and striking any navy or air units that may have been missed on D-1. Each of the 14 B-26 aircraft is expected to make two strikes against Cuba on D-1 and D-Day. Their flights will all originate from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua.

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Flight time between Puerto Cabezas and Cuba is approximately 2 hours 20 minutes each way, and when aircraft make more than one strike a day against Cuba, it will take about two hours on the ground at Puerto Cabezas for rearming and refueling. Aircraft carrying napalm will be able to stay in the target area approximately twenty minutes with a one hour fuel reserve. Aircraft not carrying napalm will have pylon tanks enabling them to stay in the target area approximately two hours with one hour fuel reserve.

4. In addition to the B-26 aircraft the volunteer force will have 5 C-46 aircraft, and 10, C-54 aircraft available for logistic and transport purposes. These cargo aircraft will operate from Retalhuleu in Guatemala, and Puerto Cabezas. The cargo aircraft have adequate range capabilities to perform any missions required by the operation.

5. The volunteer air force has adequate fuels, ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance personnel available for the operation, for example, 150,000 gals. of aviation gasoline; 2000 five inch rockets; 16 spare engines; 30-40 U.S. maintenance specialists plus 12 Cubans.

6. Castros Air Force has approximately 17 B-26 aircraft (with only 4 in commission; they have 15 "Sea Fury" piston fighters with approximately 3 in commission. They have approximately 20-25 pilots of fair capability available to fly these aircraft. However, its reported that 100 Cuban pilots are being trained in communist countries. The Cuban air force has 15 airfields suitable for handling jet aircraft. However,

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the aircraft presently in the Cuban inventory having a potential combat capability are based on only six of these airfields.

7. There is no firm evidence that the Cubans have an effective radar or anti-aircraft capability. This is attested to by the fact that approximately twenty air missions have been conducted over Cuba in the past few months without interception nor attack by other than random small arms fire.

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APPENDIX "E" TO ANNEX "A"

LOGISTICS

1. Personnel - Of the 826 strength in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters.

2. The quantities of Class I, III, and V supplies are adequate for the operation.

3. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability.

4. Plans call for Class I, III, and V supplies to be mounted-out from New Orleans, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift.

5. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis.

EVALUATION

6. Evaluation

a. Supply

(1) Adequate materials are available.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Organic medical capability is minimal. Brigade expects to be able to utilize civilian hospital facilities by D/1. This facility will provide adequate space and equipment. Plans are not clear as to control measures to be instituted for continued operation of hospital.

c. Transportation

(1) Organic transportation is expected to be augmented by civilian transportation on D/1.

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(2) The Brigade is deficient in spare parts, and maintenance and repair capabilities.

d. Service

(1) No engineer capability.

(2) No bridging capability.

(3) No flood light trailers for beach and dump operations during darkness.

(4) Inadequate shore party personnel and equipment for handling heavy loads over the beach.

(5) No ships platoons. Comment was made that ships would be off-loaded by contract labor. More detailed planning will be necessary to ensure success.

(6) Plans are to move supplies across the beach as follows:

(a) Preloaded vehicles from LCU's over beach matting on 1st trip.

(b) Vehicles discharge loads in beach dumps, return to beach, reload aboard LCU's and return to sea to be loaded from ships hold. This plan has several serious defects:

i. LCU's must remain idle on shore until trucks unload in dumps.

ii. Beach may be such that it will not permit sustained traffic even with beach matting.

iii. To load truck in LCU's from ships at sea is impractical. This in view of the lack of ships platoons.

(7) Plans for the provision of resupply of Class III are inadequate. The two 3000 gal refuelers are to provide

avgas to the airstrip. This being the case, no mogas capability exists other than drummed fuel dispensed with wabble pumps. The efficient operation of such a fuel point would require a lighting system, flood light trailer, and minimum of one crane.

(8) Plans for control and distribution of supplies in dump areas are sketchy.

(9) Inadequate repair and maintenance facilities for vehicles and tanks. No tank retriever. The 3000 gallon refuelers should be used to supply fuel to tanks and vehicles. Aviation refueling should be done outside objective areas.

(10) No plan evident for evacuation and repair of vehicles and equipment.

(11) No plan for safeguarding dumps from pilferage by indigenous personnel.

(12) Plans call for supplies to be preloaded in 3 embarkation areas: New Orleans, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. No member of the Brigade is conversant with the loading. Logistic personnel will become acquainted with the loading plans immediately prior to D-day while at sea. No TACLOG operations are contemplated. Under these circumstances, reliance on selective unloading of ships is hazardous.

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ANNEX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Friendly Forces

a. A task force with an approximate strength of 1040 officers and enlisted men has been recruited, assembled and is now undergoing training. This task force consists of a ground force unit with an approximate strength of 826 personnel, a seaborne support element of approximately 40 individuals, and an air combat and support element with an approximate personnel strength of 100.

b. The ground force unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion and consists of one Headquarters and Support Company, four Rifle Companies, one Heavy Gun Company and one Tank (M41) Platoon. One Rifle Company has received airborne training, one Rifle Company has received training as motorized infantry to operate with the Tank Platoon, and three of the Rifle Companies are theoretically trained to engage in amphibious landings. To date, no actual training in amphibious landings has been accomplished by the Rifle Companies. Boat crews to operate the landing craft are currently undergoing training. M41 tank crews have not received sufficient training as yet; however, it is anticipated that adequate training will be provided within the United States. Eighty airborne trained personnel have received additional training as a special purpose unit, designed to parachute into general area of operation on D-Day to insure that strategic bridges are demolished and thereby denied to the enemy. (For further details on assault force, see Appendix "B" to Annex "A".)

c. Seaborne support unit has available a limited number of vessels and landing craft for training and for the conduct

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of its operational mission. (For further details, see Appendix "B" to Annex "A".) A detachment of 11 personnel is receiving specialized training in underwater operations to qualify them to mark the channel of approach for landing craft on D-Day.

d. The Air Force combat and support element has available 18 trained pilots within its total strength of 100. Aircraft available and being used for training are: 17 B-26's, 10 C-54's, and 5 C-46's.

e. All of the above information was obtained by representatives of the Joint Staff as a result of a briefing held 31 January 1961. There is no indication that personnel of the task force have received a combat type checklist evaluation to determine its combat readiness.

2. Beachhead Area. The general objective area is isolated from the location of Cuban Army units and is strategically located so as to facilitate blocking rapid reinforcement by cutting bridges on the two main roads and the railroad into the area. The location of the area also facilitates expansion of military and para-military operations. The selected beaches for the amphibious assault are suitable for the landing envisaged, provide adequate exits, and can be readily identified from seaward. The airborne landing area is adequate for the planned one company drop and is adjacent to the company's objective area. Tanks can operate throughout most of the beachhead area. Overall, the objective area is considered desirable for the type operation envisaged.

3. Air Movement to the Port of Embarkation. The troops that are to be moved amphibiously will be flown to Puerto Cabezas during three consecutive nights prior to their departure

for Cuba. This airlift is well within the capability of the volunteer force. However, this traffic converging on Puerto Cabezas, coming on the heels of recent construction there, might alert Castro-Communist elements who could possibly observe the loading of the troops on the LST's and report this information to Cuba. To eliminate this possibility, other plans for moving these troops to the LST's should be examined. For example: It might be feasible to airlift these troops from Retalehuleu to Swan Island for loading onto the LST's. This would reduce the likelihood of being observed by Castro-Communist elements, and would cut the time needed to move from the point of embarkation to the invasion beaches by approximately one day.

4. Sea Movement

a. The plan requires that shipping be loaded at New Orleans, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Vieques. Commencing at D-15, shipping will load supplies at New Orleans and proceed independently to ports in Guatemala and Nicaragua. At the same time, other ships of the invasion force will be loading personnel and equipment at Vieques. All shipping, upon completion of embarkation, will steam independently to a rendezvous area off the Cayman Islands to arrive on D-1. Each ship will travel on individual orders without knowledge of the orders of other ships in the force. The result will be dependent on the coordination and control exercised in the execution of a detailed, exacting plan. Once in the rendezvous area at the Cayman Islands, certain key personnel will conduct pre-D-Day transfer among shipping. The final movement into the objective area includes the rendezvous with the invasion fleet of one U.S. Navy LSD. Final juncture of shipping is effected at H-5 hours on D-Day off the invasion beaches.

b. The complicated and multiple ship movements for the 14 days prior to D-Day will require plans in exact detail, executed under centralized control and coordination.

5. Air Operations

a. Given the correctness of the current CIA estimate of Cuban air defense capabilities, and assuming the air attack will have the advantage of surprise, the D-1 and D-Day air operations should be generally successful.

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b. However, if the CIA estimate is incorrect, and it develops that the Cubans possess jet aircraft and pilots, and ground to air missiles, the air strikes could fail.

c. Furthermore, if the element of surprise is lost, the Cubans could utilize a few of their Sea Furys and B-26 aircraft airborne. The Cubans could also set sugar cane fires generating smoke that could frustrate at least some air strike missions, with the over-all effect that the D-1 and D-Day air operations would not accomplish all assigned missions.

6. Airborne Assault. The task force has adequate transport aircraft to lift the entire airborne infantry company to the landing zone within the beachhead. In view of the size of the drop zone, and its location in relation to the airborne company's objective, the airborne assault should be successful in seizing and holding the key terrain objective.

7. The Amphibious Assault

a. The amphibious element of the force has received no amphibious training and is not now scheduled to receive any prior to the operation. This deficiency will not be too serious if estimate of unopposed landing holds true. Nevertheless, lack of sufficient trained shore party personnel will complicate control in moving personnel and materiel across the beaches. Facilities for handling broached boats are not available. Trained personnel are not generally available for traffic control, beach installations, and control of dump sites.

b. Beaches are adequate to land personnel and equipment according to plan. Routes of egress restrict the landing of heavy vehicles to the beach on the right flank. Beaches are generally marked by significant terrain features. In

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addition, UDT trained personnel will be utilized to mark the approaches to the principal beach on the right flank.

c. The amphibious assault does appear feasible, but there should be detailed plans to insure coordination of landing and effective handling of supplies and equipment across the beach and at least mockup training should be conducted.

d. The personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. This operation may be supported logistically on an austere basis during an unopposed landing. If opposition increases, the logistical aspects will rapidly worsen. Against moderate, determined resistance, this plan will fail to provide adequate logistic support.

8. Concept of Control of Beachhead Area

a. The concept of the invasion assigns the airborne company the mission of seizing the key hill mass which dominates the northern portion of the beachhead area and the town. One company lands amphibiously on the left flank beach, then proceeds to an objective area on the left flank which controls routes of ingress from the west. The first company to land amphibiously on the right flank beach clears the airfield, then moves to an objective area on the northeast portion of the beachhead area which controls the main highway and railroad from the east. The last company leaves one platoon on the right flank beach to assist in beach operations; the remainder of the company clears the port, then proceeds to an objective area on the eastern part of the beachhead area to control the unimproved roads in that area that lead to the east.

b. The units will maintain control by establishment of strong points, road blocks, and neutralization of avenues of

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approach. Patrols will be utilized to cover the principal routes leading into the beachhead area.

c. A major problem could arise in control of indigenous personnel. In this regard, desirability of control of radio and news media may be stressed. Provisions need be made for the prevention of sabotage, operation of port facilities, traffic control measures to restrict civilian movement in the beachhead area, care and control of POW's, and utilization of indigenous labor. Particular attention is required to restrict local civilian personnel from interfering with air operations at the air strip within the beachhead area. The question of local procurement of materiel on the local market may merit consideration. The plan is deficient in that it does not provide for these matters. It has been indicated that plans are being prepared which will take these problems into account. However, the size and composition of the force as it now stands is inadequate to fulfill the requirements described above.

d. The invasion force intends to establish contact with the guerrilla bands now operating in the general area of operations. According to currently available intelligence, it is estimated that within a 25 mile radius of the objective area, five guerrilla bands with a total estimated strength of 660 may cooperate with the task force. Another guerrilla band with an estimated strength of 90 is operating approximately 30 miles west of the objective area. Two additional guerrilla bands are operating some 40 miles north of the objective area. The concept is for these bands to reinforce the invasion force in the beachhead area. This part of the concept is not considered sound. It would appear that it would be desirable for the guerrilla bands now established within the area of operations to

intensify operations and hold their current operating areas as a base to which the invasion force can withdraw if it is forced out of the beachhead.

9. Local Indigenous Support

a. Any invasion to overthrow the Castro regime would probably be supported by many segments of the population, especially if it showed some early success. Continued support of the invasion would depend largely on the identification of leaders with the hopes and aspirations of the bulk of the population. While some preliminary softening probably would be accepted as necessary for success of the operation, wholesale bombings would tend to unite the people behind Castro, especially if there was high loss of life as a result.

b. If the leaders of the movement can get their message across to the people rapidly and with a united voice, support probably will be forthcoming from all segments, including the armed forces and militia and widespread defections could be expected. However, a split in the leadership, or lack of a clear program appealing to the people, could well prevent any effective support developing. In the general area of operations, the loyalty of the militia and police units is probably divided between support for Castro and support for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the mountains. The militia units now engaged in counter-guerrilla operations were drawn from other provinces in order to assure their loyalty. Therefore, considerable local support for the invasion force can probably be expected. Likewise, if widespread support for the invasion force develops, it would reduce the militia units and rebel army elements available to oppose the landing force in subsequent operations.

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10. Resistance to Invasion and Time and Space Factors on Cuban Army Reaction

a. The nearest Cuban Army Forces, approximately 100 miles away, are not normally concentrated but scattered throughout the area. Even if assembly of these forces commences on the evening of D-1, it is estimated that only a small element (approximately 1 battalion) could commence movement towards the area by the night of D-Day. Additional forces could begin departing for the area immediately thereafter as transportation becomes available. The initial elements of these forces could arrive in the area in about 8 hours, and could begin to probe the beachhead by D/1.

b. By U.S. combat standards without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, a force of approximate regimental size should be able to attack late on D/1. However, in view of the inexperience of the Cuban Army in this type of operation it is estimated that a force large enough to attack in strength could not be assembled in the beachhead area before D/2. The necessity to develop the location of the invasion force positions and prepare a coordinated attack would probably take an additional two days, although minor attacks or piecemeal attacks could occur between D/2 and D/4. If there is interference as planned from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, the mounting of a coordinated counterattack would be further delayed.

c. Without interference, tank units could reach the area from Santa Clara by road in approximately 8 hours and from Managua by rail and road in a maximum of 56 hours after starting to load.

d. Even if the invasion task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising

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or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

11. Political-Military Considerations

a. When this plan was originally briefed to the Joint Staff in outline form the impression was gained that the force would occupy a small perimeter in the mountains where it could fairly easily be surrounded and destroyed. If such an event should appear imminent after declaration of a provisional government and U.S. recognition, U.S. overt support would have to be given to uphold U.S. prestige regardless of the international consequences. The detailed explanation of the plan now reveals that if the beachhead area cannot be held, the force together with leaders of the provisional government will withdraw into the mountains and join existing guerrilla bands. In this eventuality, the invasion force will not have completely failed in its mission, and the U.S. would not necessarily be committed to overt support. Therefore, a decision to commit this force would not necessarily require a simultaneous decision for overt U.S. military action.

b. If the United States had not recognized the provisional government prior to abandonment of the beachhead, subsequent U.S. actions could be in the form of continued covert support of a guerrilla movement. If the United States had recognized the provisional government, prior to abandonment of the beachhead, then a decision as to whether U.S. prestige would require overt support would be required. This eventuality should be considered at the time the basic decision to execute the plan is made.

c. The present plan does not allow for the possibility of follow-up support from other Latin American countries

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in subsequent phases of the operation. Such support would increase the capabilities of the military force and, it is estimated, would intensify local Cuban support. The introduction of such forces would create problems of supply, command, prestige, etc. which would be solvable, but which would have to be anticipated and included in prior planning. Therefore, a decision as to possible OAS support should be sought without delay.

12. Ability to Accomplish Mission

a. The following are factors favorable to the invasion force:

(1) Probably unopposed landing.

(2) Probable lack of air opposition.

(3) Availability of friendly air support.

(4) Suitability of terrain for fixed defense.

(5) Remoteness of beachhead area.

(6) Assistance from guerrillas.

(7) High motivation and morale.

b. Following are factors unfavorable to the invasion force:

(1) Lack of reserves.

(2) Lack of logistic support elements.

(3) Lack of freedom of maneuver.

c. Following are unknown factors:

(1) Degree of popular support.

(2) Capabilities of Cuban Army to successfully counterattack.

d. Considering the above factors, on balance the invasion force should be able to accomplish objectives as stated in paragraph 2a and c. Since objective stated in paragraph 2b is dependent on degree of popular support

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and success of the political, psychological part of this plan rather than on purely military factors, success of this part of the mission cannot be definitely assured, but is is estimated has a fair chance of success.

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JCSM-146-61
14 MAR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961, which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.

2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.

3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.

a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.

b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since

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no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure.

4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above.

b. A decision with respect to the employment of this task force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training.

c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachments
5 copies of Appendix

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EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Approval of paragraph 1-p of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.

3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.

4. For additional factors, see:

a. Enclosure "A" for air factors.

b. Enclosure "B" for ground factors.

c. Enclosure "C" for logistic factors.

DISCUSSION

5. a. See Enclosure "A" for a discussion of the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

b. See Enclosure "B" for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

c. See Enclosure "C" for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

CONCLUSIONS

6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

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7. By 15 March 1961, the ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.

8. The Cuban Volunteer force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.

9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.

10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.

12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

AIR EVALUATOR - Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAF

GROUND EVALUATOR -

LOGISTIC EVALUATOR -

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ENCLOSURE "A"

EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. FACTS - The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has:

a. 16 B-26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these pilots has flown approximately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and dropped 30 bombs - 15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B-26 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these seven pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, fired 6, five inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs - 3 skip and 6 glide.

b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B-26s with Loran and low level navigation qualifications.

c. They have 7 crews trained in the C-46, and eight crews trained in the C-54.

d. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones.

e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing,

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rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second hand reports.

f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of approximately 92%.

h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing training.

j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the Problem.)

3. ASSUMPTIONS - on which CIA bases its current plan:

a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit of surprise.

b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will probably be located on three, and not more than six airfields.

c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban air defense capabilities are accurate.

d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be required to receive permission from their headquarters in Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft.

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e. The B-26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas.

4. ASSUMPTION - of the evaluator:

a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation:

(1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B-26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

(2) After the B-26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B-26 will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation.

c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the paradrops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft.

DISCUSSION

5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with

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Cuban and American personnel.

6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered:

a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding.

b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II.

c. Nine of the B-26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B-26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B-26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B-26 equals that of the first nine B-26 pilots.

d. All of the sixteen B-26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Loran and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu.

e. The B-26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated.

f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

g. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions

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over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones.

h. Aircrew effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements. The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castro's combat aircraft. The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved. As a consequence, Castro's combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields. Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since Castro's anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana. The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion. Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force.

i. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B-26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B-26 and used in the initial air strikes. One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castro's combat aircraft are based.

7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical

to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission requirements.

8. Inasmuch as:

a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of 92%.

b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing training.

d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L., and munitions, on hand, enroute, or on order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix)

In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

9. Based on an understanding of Castro's and the USSR's vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castro's Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of Castro's combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50

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caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows:

a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights.

b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somoza's best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield. Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again,

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in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main force boards the ships, and it became obvious the force is on its way, Castro's combat aircraft could be scattered from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be taken, could create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce the time necessary to transport the invasion force from Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day - thereby increasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of five to one.

12. Consequently, its believed serious consideration should be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, excepting as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

CONCLUSIONS

13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intelligence estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are

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correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

AIR EVALUATOR - Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAF

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ENCLOSURE "B"

EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.

5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.

6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

Ground Evaluator -

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Length of service of personnel:

a. Varies - few days to 8 months.

b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training.

2. Organization:

a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109-162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn - parachutists. (145)

b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles, (6-4.2 mort., 3 each RR).

c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox.

3. Training:

a. Guerrilla Opns - by civilian contract pers.

b. Basic military training - some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams.

c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised - additional on own time.

d. Airborne - Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps - jumpmaster at least 5 jumps.

e. Infiltration course - day and night - all pers.

f. Reaction course - all personnel.

g. Close combat, unarmed defense - all personnel.

h. Maps and compass - incl. night compass course.

i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling - day and night.

j. Weapons - familiarization firing on all weapons - cross training - field firing exercise.

k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry - tank team theory, but no practical work - organization and conduct of the defense.

l. Demolitions and field fortifications.

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m. Bayonet training.

n. Communications - nets and procedure.

o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night.

p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training.

q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate.

r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area.

4. Observed Training:

a. Brigade (battalion) in attack;

(1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B-26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2" and 81 mm mortar sections - blank ammo used.

(2) Use of terrain - good - covered routes used.

(3) Control - fair.

(4) Leadership - good.

(5) Reorganization on objective - good.

(6) Organization of position - good.

b. Battalion (company) in attack;

(1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem.

(2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire.

(3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead fire on objective.

(4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area.

(5) Use of weapons - good to excellent.

(6) Fire and maneuver - excellent.

(7) Evacuation of casualties - good.

(8) Control - excellent.

(9) Physical fitness - superior.

(10) Morale - superior.

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c. Firing demonstration - Heavy Gun Battalion;

(1) Included 4.2" mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG.

(2) Accuracy - excellent.

(3) Control - excellent.

(4) Condition of equipment - superior.

(5) Immediate action - excellent.

d. Individual Training;

(1) Mechanical training; cal 30 light MG, M1917A1, Reaction course, field demolitions.

(2) Instructor personnel - good - used interpretors to communicate with trainees.

(3) Effectiveness of instruction - good - interest was high - almost all practical work.

5. Equipment:

a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training except proper maps of the local area.

b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits.

c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission.

d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC-10's, 10 PE-33's, and 10 TP-1's used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand.

e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date.

f. 5-M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning.

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6. Future Training Programmed:

a. Brigade exercises;

(1) Brigade in attack - 2 ea of 2 days duration.

(2) Brigade in defense - 2 ea of 2 days duration.

(3) Simulated beach landing - 5 ea - 1 day exercises.

b. Brigade march - 35 miles cross-country to beach and return - 2 days each way.

c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons - 7 days.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training.

2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job.

3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed.

4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service.

5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which binds them together is removed.

6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice.

7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a

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few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they can't keep up are returned to Miami.

8. Security

a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation except when, where, and in what strength.

b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area.

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ENCLOSURE C

EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE CIA TASK FORCE

1. THE PROBLEM

a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

2. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations.

b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics.

c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations.

d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted.

e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements.

f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion.

3. DISCUSSION

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly

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to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that planes are loaded with material available and receiving units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes after delivery. No action was being taken to designate priorities since all items were so considered. There was a lack of logistic coordination in this instance.

b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training due to the on-the-job situation in bivouac. Preparation of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of logistics: No shore party organization has been formed nor is training being conducted in shore party operations. No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply points, inventory control, movement and distribution of supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations. The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective area and units could help themselves to fulfill their requirements.

c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate training in convoy and general operational procedures. Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely

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limited. In view of the complicated process of backing vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCU's, this deficiency is considered of major importance.

d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected. The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery or air landing of supplies.

e. The medical organization of the force is well organized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete, and appear to be understood by all personnel involved. Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate.

f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained personnel are available to perform the second and limited third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment are adequate.

g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational equipment are in good condition and well cared for. Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understandable since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and are being utilized under field conditions.

h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety

over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous training schedule for six months or more and are living under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the prospect of moving to the objective area.

1. A decision as to whether or not the operation will take place is necessary in the near future due to the impending rainy season. It is considered that operations during the rainy season would present unsurmountable difficulties in view of the limited equipment available. Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc., necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since they are handling shipping arrangements.

4. CONCLUSIONS

a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with its present logistic organization.

b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive, effective logistic support capability.

c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in operational logistics be provided to the training unit at the earliest practicable date.

d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and trained as soon as possible.

e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be

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partially accomplished by night operations within the camp areas.

f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported medically for operational functions well in excess of 30 days.

g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer Force are adequate for the operation.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED

a. That a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as practicable.

LOGISTIC EVALUATOR -

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11 MAR 1961

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistence activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows:

a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucioniaro Democratico), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal

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Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

(1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCUs and 4 LCVPs.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The

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Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is

making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action

involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.

b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragragh 3.B. above.

d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength.

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4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.

a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.)

b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualities could not be evacuated.

c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the

contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock.

c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U. S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U. S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

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a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault.

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

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8. Conclusions:

a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.

d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

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JCSM-166-61
15 MAR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of three alternate concepts for the CIA Para-Military plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Government. The military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 3 February 1961, and the evaluation of the proposed supplementary phase to the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-149-61, subject: "Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba", dated 10 March 1961.

2. The following CIA alternate concepts of operations were evaluated:

a. Alternative I - Original para-military plan, except main landings at night, without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes. See Appendix A hereto for details and evaluation.

b. Alternative II - At an objective area on NE coast, employment of airborne company at evening nautical twilight to seize key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into objective area to isolate same; this followed by night debarkation of remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from airstrip within objective area following day. See Appendix B hereto for details and evaluation.

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c. Alternative III - At an objective area on the southern coast, amphibious landing of two infantry companies after dark to seize key areas; during the night, land remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from the airstrips the following day. See Appendix C hereto for details and evaluation.

3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

a. Alternative I - Without the psychological impact of the original concept, together with the difficulties of landing at night in this area and the lack of ability to initiate air operations, the ultimate success of Alternative I is doubtful.

b. Alternative II - Even though the Cuban Volunteer Force could be landed and sustained for a minimum of 3 days, the distance from the seat of government, together with the problem of continuous resupply over long distances, causes this course of action to be least likely to accomplish the objective.

c. Alternative III has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace.

d. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III is considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.

e. None of the alternative concepts are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic para-military plan.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.

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b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the Appendices hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (10 pages)
7 copies of Appendices

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APPENDIX A

EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ORIGINAL CIA PARA-MILITARY PLAN FOR CUBA: WITH THE CHANGES THAT THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WILL BE MADE AT NIGHT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT, OR AIR STRIKES

1. The concept of the plan is as follows: Following a deception landing on the night of D-1 the Task Force, accompanied by provisional government representation, will invade at night by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. The force will immediately move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the objective area. At dawn control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominates entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in the general area of operations. The small airstrip will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase the force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. The force will establish control within the beachhead area and if driven therefrom, will be prepared to withdraw and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities.

2. The enemy forces, terrain, beaches, man-made installations and populace, remain the same as set forth in the original plan; the time and space factors remain the same with the exceptions that:

a. The amphibious landing will be made at night;

b. Immediately upon landing, the force will move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the city. Then at dawn they will move out to seize and organize the strong points on key terrain as originally planned;

c. The airborne assault and the air strikes will not be conducted.

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3. a. Advantages

(1) The force will move ashore at night, increasing the possibility of achieving tactical surprise.

(2) The landing will be near a mountainous region in the event the force is unable to maintain its lodgment, and it becomes necessary to move out of the beachhead area and conduct guerrilla operations.

(3) The landing area is relatively near the seat of government, thereby making it potentially possible to move upon the ultimate objective area in a relatively short period of time.

(4) Large numbers of the populace in the landing area are believed to be antagonistic to Castro's regime.

(5) The beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The airstrip is inadequate for B-26 operations.

(2) Without benefit of air operations, elements of Castro's Air Force would be available for use against the force. These aircraft could make it impossible for the force to hold a lodgment in the beachhead area, or virtually any fixed or exposed position, thereby forcing the volunteers to move into the mountains as a guerrilla force almost immediately.

(3) It will be difficult for a force inexperienced in amphibious operations to locate and use the narrow landing beaches at night.

4. Conclusions:

a. Despite the disadvantages enumerated above, this concept would provide a fair chance of success in landing and seizing initial objectives.

b. The lack of air support and the difficulties of supply at night, or under possible air attack if attempted in daylight, indicate small chance of ultimate success for this concept.

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APPENDIX B

CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL TO LAND ON THE EASTERN END OF THE ISLAND TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES OF THE CIA PARA-MILITARY PLAN, CUBA

1. The concept of operation for landing on the Eastern end of the Island envisages the employment of an airborne company to land during the hours of darkness on D-Day to seize a landing pier in the area together with key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into the area. During the night of D-Day, ships transporting the remainder of the Cuban Volunteer Task Force will dock alongside the landing pier, discharge the personnel and supplies and depart the area prior to daylight. Units of the Task Force will proceed inland, seize an airfield, other strategic terrain features, and establish contact with the Airborne Company to assure protection of the lodgment area.

2. One company of the Cuban military forces is located in the objective area and probably patrols the area. The closest known Cuban Army units which could be used as reinforcements are, one Infantry Battalion and one Field Artillery Battalion located 35 miles away. These units probably could not be assembled and moved to the area in less than 24 hours due to limited transportation available and condition of the roads over which they must travel.

3. The objective area consists of rolling terrain adjacent to the shoreline and backed by swamp lands which extend inland. The terrain features and vegetation can provide adequate protection and concealment for the landing force. Water approaches to the landing pier are protected from the

open sea by extentions of land on either side and depth of water will accept all shipping available to the Task Force. However, negotiation of the channels at night will be difficult.

a. There are two improved roads leading into the area; however, connection between them consists of unimproved roads and trails. Absence of a well developed road net combined with the swampy terrain will hamper movement of large military forces.

b. An airfield is located 1.5 miles Southeast of the proposed landing area. Its discription is as follows:

Runway dimensions 4000'x120'
Surface construction is asphalt and oiled sand.
The field will accept C-47 type aircraft
Runway extensibility, 11,000 ft.
Operations capabilities are negligible and the field can only be classified as a good all-weather emergency strip.

c. Adjacent to the landing pier is a village with approximate population of 18,000. The rural area adjacent thereto is underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Attitude of the local populace toward the Castro Government is not known, however, due to the remoteness of the area it may be assumed that a neutral attitude would prevail during the initial phases of the operation.

4. Conclusions

a. The selected objective area, drop zones and landing piers are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.

b. The known or expected location of Cuban Military Forces indicates that complete surprise may not be attained.

c. Operational capabilities of the airfield in the area are negligible and can be classified as only a good all weather emergency strip.

d. Given the opportunity to seize its proposed objectives, the Task Force will have the capability to sustain itself without resupply for a minimum of 3 days.

e. A landing in this area would be so far removed from the seat of Government it is doubtful that the desired psychological effect on the Cuban people would be attained.

f. If the Task Force is required to abandon its primary mission, evacuation by sea could probably be accomplished or elements of the force could continue to operate as guerrilla units in the area. The mountainous area approximately 10 miles inland is considered suitable for guerrilla operations.

g. This operation would be difficult to support from a logistic standpoint.

h. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this proposed course of action.

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APPENDIX C

CONCEPT OF AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL TO LAND
ON AN OBJECTIVE AREA ON THE SOUTHERN COAST

1. Concept: Under cover of darkness, two companies will land over the two beaches at the head of the bay, rapidly move inland, seize their assigned objectives, and prepare to defend them. A small combat outpost will be landed on the east side of the entrance to the bay to provide warning and block the coast road from the east. A combat outpost will be established to close the road across the swamp to the west of the landing beaches. The remaining four companies will be landed prior to dawn and will proceed to their assigned objectives. All boats will withdraw to sea and be clear of the area prior to daylight. At daylight, B-26 aircraft will land on the seized airfield or airfields and conduct air operations from these locations immediately thereafter.

2. Enemy Forces: There are no known enemy forces in the objective area, although it is probable that militia patrols maintain surveillance over the coast road. The nearest concentration of Cuban Rebel Army forces are located at Managua, near Havana, and at Santa Clara. Rural police posts are located in the villages and towns, but their capability is limited to employment in small groups using small arms. The nearest sizable militia unit is located at Cienfuegos, but there may be smaller militia elements as close as ten miles from the landing beaches.

3. Terrain: The terrain in the objective area is flat, swamp land covered with a dense growth of mangrove, except for a strip east of the landing beaches. This strip rises from 5 to 30 feet above mean sea level and is covered with scrub growth and high savanna grass. Entry into and exit from the

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area is confined to the established roads and a single track narrow guage railroad bed. Trafficability off roads is poor except that foot troops may move with difficulty. There are approximately seven possible exits from the area to the north and west.

4. Beaches: The bay has a number of usable beaches located along the east shore, but the best are at the head of the bay. The two beaches selected are each approximately 400 yards long and have easy exits to the coast road which skirts the bay. Seaward approaches are clear and deep water extends to within a few yards of the shore. Beach gradients from available photography appear to be suitable for dry-ramp landings of personnel and light vehicles.

5. Man-Made Installations: There are two airfields in the area, one firmly packed sod strip, carried as approximately 4000 feet long and the other a newly constructed packed coral and sand strip approximately 6000 feet long. Recently it has been reported that the sod strip is being lengthened to over 6000 feet. Both strips are currently in various stages of construction. There has been considerable road building noted in this area in the past year. The coast road has been widened and resurfaced with a concrete surface. A new road has been constructed across the eastern portion of the swamp, but this road has not yet intersected the coast road. There are no roads to the west.

6. Attitude of Populace: The objective area is very sparsely settled with no towns or villages of any size. A few scattered houses, not closely grouped, comprise the only habitations in the area. The attitude of the populace vis-a-vis Castro is unknown.

7. Time and Space Factors: Due to the sparse population, tele-communications in the area are probably poor or non-existent. The area has been an historically suitable guerrilla

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area. Reaction time for the Cuban Rebel Armed Forces is probably greater than elsewhere on the island due to the distance to be covered, the nature of the terrain, and the relatively poor road net. However, the area is within range of suitable positions for Cuban heavy artillery (122 mm gun). Observation of fire would be restricted to aerial observation by aircraft.

8. Advantages and Disadvantages:

a. Advantages

(1) Two probably usable airfields are in the area.

(2) A remote and inaccessable area making reaction against the invasion force slow and difficult.

(3) No known Cuban armed forces in the area.

(4) Swampy terrain would prevent the use of armor against the invasion force except tank gun fire.

(5) Defectors could join the invasion force, however with difficulty. A small band (approximately 100) of guerrillas are close to the area.

(6) Surprise could probably be achieved if operation was carefully timed.

(7) Relatively close to the seat of government for the resulting psychological effect on the Cuban people.

b. Disadvantages

(1) Resupply, including food, must come from outside Cuba.

(2) Exits from objective area could be sealed off and prevent expansion of operations.

(3) Firm ground in area is within range of suitable heavy artillery positions.

(4) No sizable immediate help could be expected from the local populace.

(5) No civilian hospital facilities available.

(6) All supply must be across the beach.

9. Conclusions:

a. In the absence of significant enemy forces in the area, the invasion force can be landed successfully in the objective area and can be sustained in the area provided resupply of essential items is accomplished.

b. The area meets the requirements imposed including the availability of an airfield, suitability for a clandestine landing, and possibly suitable for extending operations to cause the downfall of Castro.

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[redacted]

4 May 1961
(Revised 10 May 1961)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Briefings of JCS on "Bumpy Road" by General Gray

1. 3 February 1961 -

Twenty-minute briefing on the CIA Para-Military Plan, Trinidad area (JCSM 87-61, 3 February 1961) covering the following points.

a. Enemy Forces (Castro's Army, Air Force, Navy and Militia)

b. Friendly Forces

c. Characteristics of the invasion area

d. Concept of operations

e. Logistics

f. Conclusions of the Joint Staff Working Group's evaluation of the plan.

g. Recommendations by the Joint Staff Working Group.

2. 8 February 1961 -

The Director, Central Intelligence and several of his officers met with the JCS. General Gray was present. Discussion centered around the comments and conclusions of the JCS on the CIA para-military plan for the Trinidad area. Agreement reached that a team of military officers would evaluate the combat effectiveness of the CEF.

3. 15 March 1961 -

Twenty-minute briefing on the evaluation of the three alternate concepts, CIA para-military plan (JCSM-163-61, 15 March 1961). The briefing covered the following points:

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[redacted]

a. Alt. I - Original Trinidad Plan, except landings at night without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes.

(1) Concept

(2) Advantages

(3) Disadvantages

b. Alt. II - At an objective area on northeast coast.

(1) Concept

(2) Enemy forces, time and space

(3) Characteristics of objective area

(4) Advantages

(5) Disadvantages

c. Alt. III - At an objective area on the southern coast (head of Bahia De Cochinas).

(1) Concept

(2) Enemy Forces

(3) Characteristics of objective area

(4) Populace

(5) Advantages and disadvantages

d. Conclusions of the evaluation.

e. Recommendations by the Joint Staff Working Group.

4. 31 March 1961 -

Approximately 40-minute briefing on the over-all CIA para-military plan, [redacted] support, etc., covering the following points:

a. Cuban situation

b. Cuban Army, Navy, Air Force and Militia

c. Defections; morale of the people

[redacted]

d. Rainy season

e. Latin American situation

f. Friendly situation

g. Formation of Government (Revolutionary Council)

h. The CIA para-military plan

i. Size of CEF

j. Load-out phase

k. Movement phase

l. CINCLANT participation

m. Assault phase (including air drops, air strikes, use of airfield, control of beachhead and changes in concept).

n. Logistical support (CIA and DOD follow up)

o. Joint Staff Working Group's concept of operations

(1) Landing phase

(2) Build-up phase

(3) Offensive phase

p. DOD overt supply plan

q. Concept of CEF action if operation fails

r. Action if operation is called off

s. Current status of agreed tasks

t. Problems (hospital, ships, etc.)

u. Security

v. CINCLANT rules of engagement (SM-363-61, 1 April 1961)

5. 3 April 1961 -

Briefed JCS, SecDef, Deputy SecDef, the Vice-Chiefs and Ops Deps on the same items as above with additional details on the following:

a. CINCLANT's op order for support

b. Rules of Engagement

c. DOD follow-up logistic support

6. 7 April 1961 -

The JCS were briefed on the following:

a. Results of the meetings with the President on 4, 5 and 6 April.

b. Changes to the CIA plan as a result of these meetings, including:

(1) Planned "Defection" air strikes.

(2) Landing at Oriente by the DIAZ group on D-3 night.

c. Proposed test by CONAD of his op plan "Southern Tip" in order to increase the air defense of Florida (JCS approved, JCS 993623 dispatched)

d. Current status of DOD support.

7. 14 April 1961 -

a. Briefed on the outline logistic concept to support operation "BUMPY ROAD" beyond that previously planned (JCSM-249-61, 14 April 1961). (Note: This was the DOD overt logistic support plan.) Briefing concerned the following points:

(1) Situations which might develop

(2) Non-attributable support

(3) Reestablish MAAG/Mission, and reinstitute MAP

(4) Earmark US Survey Team

(5) Earmark MAAG personnel